136 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[chap. 



Eeasou 

 adviiDCoil 

 for think- 

 ing that 

 the cogni- 

 tion of 

 space is 

 from 

 motion. 



Time is 

 more in- 

 separable 

 from our 

 thoughts 

 than space, 



than of a surface : but, as we have seen, the reverse is 

 the case. 



The reason usually advanced in favour of the theory 

 that the cognition of space is not primary, but derived 

 from that of time through the means of motion, is, that 

 motion is capable of producing it, and that no cognition 

 ought to be regarded as primary if it can possibly have 

 been derived from any other. I have stated my reason 

 for thinking, in opposition to this theory, that our mode of 

 thinking of space is different from what it would be if it 

 had been produced in that way. But in my opinion the 

 really strong reason for thinking that the cognition of space 

 is somehow less of a primary cognition than that of time, 

 is the fact, of which every one must be aware w?io has 

 read or thought on the questions of modern metaphysical 

 controversy, that there is something perplexing, something, 

 it may be said, unmanageable, in the relation of the mind 

 to space, which there is not in its relation to time. And, 

 argue as we may, we cannot get rid of the fact, that time 

 is much more inseparable from our thoughts than space. 

 It is true, as already remarked, that we cannot conceive of 

 a universe without them both. But it is also true that we 

 think in time, and do not think in space ; and we cannot 

 by any process of reasoning get rid of the notion that 

 "the external world "does exist in space, in a sense in 

 which the same is not true of " the internal world : " or, 

 in other words, that space is somehow external to the 

 mind. These facts convinced me, when my attention was 

 first directed to this class of subjects, that the cognition of 

 space was formed in the mind later than that of time, or, 

 at least, must be formed in a fundamentally different way ; 

 and I am inclined to think that these facts are what 

 really determine such thinkers as Mr. Mill, though it may 

 be in some degree unconsciously to themselves, in favour 

 of the theory of our knowledge of space being altogether 

 acquired l^y means of motion. It is unquestionably true 

 that, in the way I have just stated, the relation of our 

 consciousness to space is unlike its relation to time. But 

 this fact will, I think, lose its force if it can be shown to 



