138 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[chap. 



tu mind. 



Of tliese, 

 only the 

 first two 

 give cog- 

 nition of 

 space. 



The fact that we do so, though it is a fact of couscious- 

 ness, is, I thiuk, not an ultimate fact, but one that admits 

 of being accounted for. In order to account for it we 

 must go beyond the general fact that consciousness is 

 developed out of sensation, and examine the constitution 

 of the separate sensory faculties. 

 Touch, The sensory faculties which we have to examiue are 



siglit, and Qjjiy j.|jg three intellectual senses : that is to say, touch, 



hearing •' ' . 



minister sight, and hearing : for these are the only senses which, iu 

 man at least, have any appreciable effect in producing 

 mental development.^ Now, it needs no proof that it is 

 only touch atad sight which give rise to any cognition 

 of space (including the mnscular sense as belonging to 

 touch). Hearing alone could not give it. But, in com- 

 pensation for being unable to cognise space, the sense of 

 hearing has the remarkable power, in which it differs 

 from all the other senses, of cognising different simulta- 

 neous sounds without their combining into one ; that is 

 to say, of cognising sensations as distinct which are sensa- 

 tions of the same sense, and are not separated either in 

 time or in space ; and not only of cognising them as 

 distinct, but of either attending to one of them in pre- 

 ference to the others, or else of attending to several at 

 once, so as to cognise their mutual relation. 



Time is cognised by all the senses, because all sensations 

 succeed each other in time ; but space is cognised only by 

 touch and sight. This fact — that time is cognised by all 

 the senses, and space by only some of them — is, I think, 

 enough to account for the fact that we thiuk in time, and 



Hearing is not in space. But this is not all. That intellectual sense 



the most ^ • ^ ■ -j ■ c i j.i c 



closely which givcs no cognition or space — namely, the sense of 

 connected hearing — is of all the senses the most closely associated 

 thought, with thought. This is probably a consequence of the habit 

 because we q£ thinking in words, which is necessary to any high deve- 

 words. lopment of thought. It is also to be observed that sensa- 

 Sensatious tions of different senses are cognised either as simultaneous 

 ot ddierent qj, ^g successive. If, for instance, we see a flash and hear a 



senses 



may give sliot, we are conscious of hearing the shot either at what 



'^ See the Chapiter on the Senses (Chai). XXXV.). 



