XXXVII.] RELATION OF MIND TO SPACE AND TIME. 141 



it conceivably possible to do so ? — I reply, that we think in What is 

 time by means of words whicli succeed each other in time. tMnkin^/ 

 If we were naturally, spontaneously, and unavoidably to in space, 

 think by means of diagrams drawn in space, I should call 

 this thinking in space. This, of coiirse, is not a full account 

 of a subject which, by the terms of the case, lies in a great 

 degree outside of our possibilities of thought ; I only offer 

 it as a suggestion or indication. 



It may be said, in answer to this reasoning, that I have, 

 at the most, proved the possibility of consciousness being- 

 developed in space and in time at once ; but that, if I 

 would complete my argument as to the difference between 

 the relation of time and of space to the human conscious- 

 ness being only, as it were, accidental, and not a law of all 

 consciousness, — in order to complete this argument, I say, 

 it may be urged that I ought to show the possibility of Possibility 

 consciousness beinsf developed in space and not in time, ° . °°"' 



° , ^ sciousiiess 



as a parallel and an oj)posite to the development of the indepen- 

 human consciousness in time and not in space. This, time." 

 however, is a demand which cannot be complied with. 

 The very fact of our consciousness being developed in time 

 makes it impossible for us to conceive the possibility of a 

 consciousness which is not developed in time. But though 

 it is not imaginable by us, I do not see any impossibility 

 in a consciousness being developed in space and not in 

 time : that is to say, I do not see any impossibility in 

 the consciousness of some totally different order of being- 

 becoming awakened into life — not, like ours, by the suc- 

 cession of different sensations, each occupying a distinct 

 portion of time, but by the co-existence of different sensa- 

 tions, each occupying a distinct portion of space. I say, 

 that I see nothing absurd or incredible in a consciousness 

 being in this way developed in space ; while the sensations, 

 being perfectly unchangeable, do not give rise to the 

 development of consciousness ni time. Indeed, the one 

 essential condition of the origin of consciousness, as it 

 appears to me, is neither the cognition of the succession of 

 sensations in time, nor the cognition of their separation in 

 space, but simply the cognition of difference : whether 



