CHAPTER XXXV I IT. 



TIME, SPACE, AND CAUSATION. 



IT will be perceived by any one who lias followed my i iioki the 

 reasonino's thus far, that, as regards the relation of the f,^P''iience 



° . ° theory of 



mind to space and time, I assent to the theory which is our kuow- 

 associated with the name of Locke, namely, that our know- gp Jg and 

 ledge of them is derived from experience, in preference to ti™^, in 

 the theory which is associated with the name of Kant, of to that of 

 their being d priori forms of thought existing in the mind fo'"™s of 



. , , . . thought. 



previously to experience, though it is only by means of 

 experience that the mind becomes conscious of them. I 

 see no reason whatever for thinking that the conceptions 

 of space and time exist in the mind in any form at all, 

 consciously or unconsciously, previously to experience. In 

 a word, I think with Locke, that experience is what pro- 

 duces those conceptions ; in opposition to Kant, who main- 

 tained that experience does not produce them, but only 

 calls them forth from unconsciousness into consciousness. • 



But the doctrine of Locke, which T adopt, must be But the 

 understood with a very important modification. The con- ^^psi'ience 

 ceptions of space and time are indeed results of expe- herited : 

 rience ; but it is, for the most part, not individual but 

 inherited experience : m a word, they are results of the results of 

 experience of the race, tvhich have become fm'?ns of thought \'^^^^ r 

 for the individual. the race 



Thus Locke, who derived our conceptions of space and fora°™of 

 time from experience, and Kant, who regarded them as t'lo"^'''* 



for tliG 



forms of thought, are seen to be both right ; but the truth individual. 

 seen by Locke is a wider truth than that seen by Kant, 

 and includes it. The reconciliation and union of the two. 



