XXXVIII.J TIME, SPACE, AND CAUSATION. 145 



necessary, that space and time are notliiug but forms ofFurtlier 

 thought, to which there is no corresponding reality in the sion°^that 

 world outside of the mind ; that though we are compelled space and 

 by the constitution of our faculties to perceive, and to unreal, 

 think of, objects in space and events in time, yet space 

 and time are in no way functions of the objects and of the 

 events, but solely of the mind which cognises them. Kant admitted 

 saw this inference, and admitted it. But now that we ^^ ^^"^• 

 have learned to regard thought, not as something apart The 

 from the external universe, but as the highest manifes- throry'ir" 

 tation of its highest forces — namely, those of life — it is an consistent 

 equally logical inference, and is the inference which I psVclw" 

 draw, that space and time are forms of thought Secawse ^°8y- 

 they are facts of the universe ; that they were facts of the 

 universe before they became forms of thought ; and that, 

 in a word, they are facts of the universe which have 

 become conscious of themselves in the brain of man. 



It appears to be a prevalent notion — though it was the Notion 

 notion rather of the schools of Kant and of Coleridge than ije^ii^jj^ is 

 of those which have succeeded to them — that idealism, or favoural.le 

 the theory which makes time and space, and other con- *'' ^'^ ' 

 ceptions that belong to the groundwork of our thoughts, 

 to be d priori forms having no root except in the mind 

 itself, and consequently derives all knowledge from the 

 constitution of the mind ; — it appears, 1 say, to be a pre- 

 valent notion that idealism is somehow more favourable to 

 faith than the rival experience-theory. I think this is not I think 

 only wrong, but the exact reverse of the truth. If space !^1,.,„ 

 .and time, and other fundamental conceptions, are nothing 

 but forms of thought, to which nothing in the universe 

 around us necessarily corresponds, then they are, or may 

 be, totally unreal ; and absolute truth — that is to say, truth 

 which is true for all natures whatever — is unattainable by 

 us, and perhaps has no existence. Kant did not draw this Kant was 



1 • T- n ■ T ^ ^ kept from 



conclusion — his faith kept him from it ; but his philosophy scepticism 

 did not constitute a basis for his faith : on the contrary, it foith'^in 

 was his faith that kept him from what he saw and ad- spite of 

 mitted to be the logical consequence of his philosophy. ^ sophy.'"' 



' See Note at end of cliapter. 

 VOL. 11. L 



