XXXVIII.] TIME, SPACE, AND CAUSATION. ]47 



of causation taking place witbm the sphere of our con- 

 sciousness, the effect is not a sensation, but either a thought, 

 a mental feeling, or a voluntary determination ; in the 

 production of any of which the mind must be in some 

 degree active. In a word, we become cognizant of causa- Causation 

 tion in becoming conscious of our own mental action. I •'^ 'jog'^ised 



*^ _ in be- 



do not see how this fact of a direct cognition of causation coming 

 within the mind itself can be doubted. I was coiiscious, of mentTi 

 for instance, of a feeling of joy at the result of the ^<^^^o^- 

 Abyssinian war. I was conscious of assenting to the 

 reasoning by which, as stated above, H. Spencer has ex- 

 plained the origin of our conceptions of space and time as 

 results of hereditary habit. And since the commencement 

 of this work, I have often been conscious of voluntary 

 determinations, or determinations of my will, to think and 

 to write on its subjects : these determinations are not mere 

 feelings, but feelings followed by action ; and I am directly 

 cognizant of the connexion between the determination as 

 the cause and the action as its effect. 



I must here guard against a probable misconception. 

 We are directly cognizant of the relation of cause and 

 effect only when both the effect and the cause are within 

 the sphere of consciousness. Thus, when I determine to 

 think out a particular subject, and do so, I am directly 

 cognizant of the causation ; that is to say, I am directlj^ 

 cognizant of the fact that the determination of my will is 

 the cause of the direction of my thoughts. But when I There is 

 Avrite, I am not directly cognizant of my wiU as the cause cocnit'"^* 

 of the motion of my fingers, because the connexion between i^f tiie will 

 the will and the muscular actions is not within conscious- cause of 

 ness. It was maintained by AVolf, the expositor of Leibnitz, muscular 

 if he is not misrepresented, that the determinations of the 

 will and the motions of the muscles are not related as 

 cause and effect, but that the mind and the body are so 

 constructed as to act together without any such connexion ; 

 and, absurd as is such a theory, it does not actually give 

 the lie to consciousness. So far as I can perceive, our 

 only, though quite sufficient, reason for believing that our 

 muscular actions, such as the motions of the fingers in 



l2 



