xxxviii.] TLME, SPACE, AND CAUSATION. 151 



this is conclusive proof that, although we obtain our first 

 knowledge of time by direct cognition,' and it has become 

 a form of our thought by hereditary habit, yet there is 

 something in our knowledge of its properties for which 

 mere habit will not account, and which can be referred 

 only to that mental intelligence which is not a result of 

 habit. If this is true of the conception of time, it is no 

 doubt equally true of the conceptions of space and of 

 causation. 



This mental intelligence is to form the subject of the 

 next chapter. 



NOTE. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT. 



I SHALL probably be told that I have misunderstood Kant's 

 philosophy; and I admit that, like most of those who write 

 about him, I have not any knowledge of his works at first hand. 

 But I believe I am right. The system unfolded in his " Critique The 

 of the Pure Eeason " is one of absolute idealism, deriving all the of ''lia^t's 

 principles of knowledge from the constitution of the mind : this " Pure 

 is, and Kant perceived it to be, logically identical with pure i^g^ii's'^ ^^ 

 scepticism, or that system which denies the possibility of our identical 

 really knowing anything except that which passes within the scepticism- 

 mind. It is true that, in his " Critique of Practical Eeason," he 

 arrived at a different conclusion, and showed how faith was pos- u Pi-actieal 

 sible. But I beHeve I am right in saying that his " Pure Eeason " Reason " 

 is in no way a basis for his " Practical Eeason ;" that, on the 

 contrary, his " Practical Eeason," though of course it speaks in a 

 philosophical language, is in reality nothing else than faith, 

 budding itself up in spite of the sceptical conclusions of the pure 

 reason, or faculty of speculative philosophy. 



