xxxix.] MENTAL INTELLIGENCE. 161 



impression of memory ; for a doubt often arises whetlier 

 such an impression is really due to memory or only to 

 involuntary imagination. It is generally admitted, and is 

 I think indisputable, that this confidence in the veracity 

 of memory is an ultimate fact, not to be accounted for by is an 

 any other, or in any way explained. Its root and origin is fac™^**' 

 no doubt in the cognition of feelings as they follow each 

 other in the mind ; but this is no more an explanation of 

 the fact, than it would be an explanation of the life of a 

 plant to trace it back to its seed. Now, a belief which, 

 like the belief in the veracity of memory, is an ultimate aud 

 fact of mind and not to be accounted for by the laws of f^tell? *° 

 habit, is to be classed as a case of mental intelligence. gence. 



In thus expressing the opinion that the belief in the 

 laws of logic, the belief in the constancy of the order of 

 nature, and the belief in the veracity of memory, are not 

 results of experience, but d priori conditions of all thought, 

 without which impressions on the consciousness would be 

 nothing higher than sensations, and could not give rise to 

 knowledge — in expressing this opinion, I say, it may be 

 thought that I am bringiug back, under a slightly different 

 form, that doctrine of idealism which I have disavowed 

 in the last chapter. I do not deny the apparent resem- Resem- 

 blance of my theory to idealism, but it is only apparent. ^f^J^y 

 Idealism — at least the idealism of Kant — maintains that theory ta 

 such forms of thought as time, space, and causation belong ' 



to the miad, and not to the external world. I believe, on and its 

 the contrary, that such forms of thought as time, space, ^ ^rence. 

 and causation ; and such natural beliefs as the belief in the 

 laws of logic, and in the constancy of the order of nature ; 

 are laws of mind because they are laws of the external 

 world ; — I believe they are laws of nature, which have i believe 

 become conscious of themselves in the brain of man. In ^}^^ ^^y'^ °* 



thought 



the last chapter I have endeavoured to explain by what are so 

 means time, space, and causation have come within the tw^are 

 sphere of consciousness, and consequently, from being laws laws of 

 of the external world, have become habitual forms of 

 thought. If the reasoning of this chapter be sound, the 

 VOL. II. M 



