162 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[chap. 



same explanation will not apply without modification 

 to the belief in the laws of logic, in the constancy of 

 nature, and in the veracity of memory ; for these are not 

 results of habit, but of intelligence, antecedent to any pos- 

 sible formation of mental habits whatever. There is, how- 

 ever, no contradiction. To repeat the distinction which 

 I made at the beginning of this chapter, our conceptions, 

 among which I class those of time, space, and causation, 

 are due to habit; but belief implies intelligence. But in 

 the formation of both concej)tions and beliefs the mind is 

 developed in accordance with the laws of nature, and the 

 laws of nature become conscious of themselves in mind. 

 In other words, mind is a part of nature, and consequently 

 its consciousness is developed in accordance with the laws 

 of nature. 



The It follows from this, that the question whether we 



should we should expect to find the order of nature constant if it 



expect were not really constant, is an irrational question ; for if 



nature the Order of nature were not constant, oui' minds, being 



constant if p^rt of the order of nature, would have received a totally 



it WCl'6 



not so, is different development, and another set of intuitions, from 



irrational. ^j^Qgg ^iiich they actually have received. 



Intelli- 

 gence is 

 co-exten- 

 sive with 

 Ufe, 



To my conclusion that mental intelligence is an ultimate 

 fact, not to be accounted for by the law of habit, or ac- 

 coimted for at all, it is no objection that animals manifest 

 it in some degree; for, as I have in many places endea- 

 voured to show, intelligence is co-extensive with life : and 

 the organizing intelligence which adapts each part of the 

 organism to the rest, and the entire organism to its mode of 

 life ; the instinctive intelligence which constructs the cells 

 of the bee ; and the mental intelligence of man ; are all 

 fundamentally the same. Intelligence is not always con- 

 scious, and even when conscious it is not always conscious 

 of itself; indeed, I believe there is something unconscious 

 about p U thought, except that which is formally logical. 



Summary. To sum up the result of the foregoing remarks : I believe 

 that all mental determinations which go beyond the mere 



anil not 



always 



conscious. 



