182 



HABIT AND INrELLIGENCE, 



[chap. 



least is supposed to have, its origin in immemorial custom, 

 older than any statute.^ 



Habit 

 ought to 

 be con- 

 trolled by 

 intelli- 

 gence. 



Conserva- 

 tism and 

 Liberal- 

 ism. 



Moralists constantly warn us against the dominance of 

 habit, and politicians warn us against blind conservatism. 

 They are right. Habit is an unintelligent force, and ought 

 to be kept as far as possible under the control of intelli- 

 gence and will ; and mere blind conservatism is nothing 

 else than the action of unintelligent habit in politics. But 

 it is only the law of habit that makes the formation of 

 character possible, whether in an individual or in a com- 

 munity ; and therefore what we have to do with the 

 habitual forces is not to destroy them (for this, were it 

 possible, would be mental suicide), but to keep them 

 under control, so as to be capable of modification at the 

 command of intelligence. This is true alike of the indi- 

 vidual and of society. Politicians have been divided ever 

 since political progress began, and will continue to be so 

 until it has ceased, into two parties, or schools, which have 

 borne various names at various times and places, but are 

 known to us as those of Conservatism and Liberalism. It 

 is felt by all that these names indicate an important and 

 profound distinction, and it is felt by all who are anything 

 more than mere partisans that this distinction does not 

 coincide with the distinction of truth and falsehood, or with 

 that of good and evil. The basis of Conservatism is in the 

 permanence of habit : the basis of Liberalism is in the 

 possibility of habit being controlled and modified by 

 intelligence. 



The dominance of intelligence over unintelligent habit is 

 probably imperfect in even the wisest individual men, and 

 among nations it is well if it exists at all. Entire races, 



•■ The relation of written to un\yritten law api)ears to have been some- 

 what different in the ancient republics from what it is in England. The 

 Twelve Tables of early Rome, and other ancient codes, according to Mr. 

 Maine (Ancient Law, chap, i.), were not ac?(^i<«o?is to the customary laws 

 already in force, but only written expositions of them. Their usefulness 

 consisted in their publicity : for there is reason to believe that, previous 

 to their publication, the ruling aristocracies were the exclusive guardians 

 of the legal traditions, and abused the power due to that function. 



i 



