120 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[chap. 



Organic 



structure 



implies 



fuuction. 



Purpose in function, as for instance tlie relation of the structure of 

 pccuHar to *^® ^^^ ^° *^® function of vision, is something which has 

 organiza- no analogy whatever in the inorganic creation, though it 

 has analogies in machinery and other apparatus of human 

 gies in invention. The analogy of the eye to the camera obscura 

 work^ is a case in point ; in fact, the eye is a camera. And in 

 speaking of such organic adaptations, we naturally and 

 almost inevitably fall into the habit of regarding special 

 function as a proof of purpose ; and of speaking of the 

 function of an organ and of its purpose, as if the words 

 were synonymous : and this habit is not found to be mis- 

 leading ; on the contrary, it is a rule in physiological 

 research (though subject to a few very remarkable excep- 

 tions), that every organ, and every structural arrangement, 

 must have its own special purpose. These are facts, very 

 much generalized no doubt, but still facts of observation, 

 concerning which there is no room for doubt or controversy. 

 But when it is denied that there is any discernible purpose 

 in the organic creation, the meaning appears to be, that 

 the relation of special structure to special function, or 

 what I have called the relation of means to purpose, is in 

 reality only a particular case of the relation of cause and 

 effect. It would be impossible for any man of the slightest 

 intelligence, simply to deny the existence of the most 

 wonderful special adaptations in the organic creation. 

 But though not a plausible doctrine it is an arguable one, 

 and has been maintained with great knowledge and great 

 ability by Darwin in his "Origin of Species," and by 

 Spencer in his "Principles of Biology," that the laws of 

 cause and effect are adequate to account for all these ; that 

 the adaptation of the eye to light, for instance, has been 

 pi'oducecl by the direct and indirect action of light on 

 countless generations of living beings : and so of all other 

 organic adaptations. 



From this theory I utterly dissent, and in a future 

 chapter I shall give reasons which I regard as conclusive 

 against it. I believe that the relation of means and pur- 

 pose in organization is as much a primary law of nature, 

 and as incapable of being resolved into any other more 



Is this 

 relation 

 a case of 

 that of 

 cause and 

 effect? 



I believe 

 not. 



