65 



If, from considering the variety of our 

 senses, and their total want of correspond- 

 ence to the causes which must undoubtedly 

 produce them,- I mean the impulses of 

 masses or atoms of surrounding substances 

 exciting actions in our nervous fibrils, and 

 also, from the consciousness we possess of 

 the unity of that which perceives, attends, 

 reasons, decides, and wills, I am compelled 

 to admit, as I have formerly argued in the 

 lectures given in this College, that all va- 

 riety of sensation results from the nature 

 and attributes of something most wonder-r 

 fully and inexplicably perceptive. How 

 much more strongly am I compelled to 

 believe that all those curious propensities, 

 faculties, and sentiments, of which I have 

 this day spoken, are attributes of the same 

 substance. Indeed, to me it seems impos- 

 sible that any rational being should suppose 

 reason and the nobler sentiments of our 



