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ever, cannot reasonably be made, except 

 in consequence of supposing that what is 

 perceptive resembles the subjects of its 

 perception, of which alone we can form 

 any ideas. But it is not irrational to con- 

 clude, that things totally different in pro- 

 perties may be equally different in nature, 

 and thus has it been inferred, that the 

 mind does not resemble the subjects of its 

 perceptions, but is, in its nature, neither 

 mutable nor liable to decay, like the com- 

 mon forms of matter bv which we are sur- 

 rounded, and of which our bodies are 

 composed. 



No one seems better to have understood 

 the faculties and sentiments of the human 

 mind, or to have exerted them to better 

 effect, than Socrates. As he was a sculptor 

 in the early part of his life, he was in the 

 habit of saying, " How strange is it that we 



