I confess that tho I have many times thought of the 

 arguments involving cruelty, I have never come to a 

 very satisfactory conclusion upon the subject. Let 

 me attempt to prove to you why a definite conclusion 

 is difficult to form. First you must hold one of three 

 beliefs: either that man has not the right to kill any 

 form of life ; or that man has the right to kill the lower 

 forms of life or life, when that life becomes obnoxi- 

 ous! to man or stands in the way of his pleasure in too 

 great a degree; or else that man has the right to kill 

 all forms of life for his pleasure. Altho I said that 

 you must believe one of these three ideas, yet I think 

 that there are very few who believe either the first or 

 the last, absolutely, that is, without exception. So, for 

 all but extraordinary views the second is the right one. 

 Thus far, it is simple enough ; but does not the second 

 in both its definitions vary toward both the first and 

 the second, or, in other words, is it not so, that the sec- 

 ond is not a definite class at all but is merely the 

 whole scale running between the extreme and unusual 

 cases of the first and the third? 



Now the number of different views that may be 

 taken and are included in this scale are measured not 

 in thousands or in millions, but can only be measured 

 by infinity. Therefore if we wish to define the line of 

 demarkation, as to where killing is wrong and where 

 it becomes right, then we must immediately select one 

 of the infinite views for this special view. But we are 

 instantly opposed by an infinite number of different 

 beliefs because the number of cases becomes greater 

 as it moves from the extremes. 



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