Ch, xi. Bounties upon Exportation. 181 



during the ten years from 1740 to 1750, accom- 

 panied by a great fall in the continental markets, 

 owing in some degree perhaps to the great ex- 

 portations of British corn, especially during the 

 years 1748, 1749, and 1750, must necessarily 

 have given some check to its cultivation, while 

 the increase of the real price of labour must at the 

 same time have given a stimulus to the increase 

 of population. The united operation of these two 

 causes is exactly calculated first to diminish, and 

 ultimately to destroy a surplus of corn ; and as, 

 after 1764, the wealth and manufacturing popu- 

 lation of Great Britain increased more rapidly than 

 those of her neighbours, the returning stimulus to 

 agriculture, considerable as it was, arising almost 

 exclusively from a home demand, was incapable 

 of producing a surplus; and not being confined, 

 as before, to British cultivation, owing to the 

 alteration in the corn-laws, was inadequate even 

 to eifect an independent supply. Had the old 

 corn-laws remained in full force, we should still 

 probably have lost our surplus growth, owing to 

 the causes above mentioned, although, from their 

 restrictive clauses, we should certainly have been 

 nearer the growth of an independent supply im- 

 mediately previous to the scarcity of 1800. 



It is not therefore necessary, in order to object 

 to the bounty, to say with Adam Smith that the 

 fall in the price of corn which took place during 

 the first half of the last century must have hap- 

 pened in spite of the bounty, and could not possibly 

 have happened in consequence of it. We may 



