260 Of moral Restraint. Bk. iv. 



larger half of mankind, civilized or uncivilized, 

 and are indispensably necessary to the more re- 

 fined enjoyments of the other half. We are all 

 conscious of the inestimable benefits that we de- 

 rive from these desires, when directed in a certain 

 manner; but we are equally conscious of the 

 evils resulting from them, when not directed in 

 this manner ; so much so, that society has taken 

 upon itself to punish most severely what it consi- 

 ders as an irregular gratification of them. And 

 yet the desires in both cases are equally natural, 

 and, abstractedly considered, equally virtuous. 

 The act of the hungry man who satisfies his ap- 

 petite by taking a loaf from the shelf of another, 

 is in no respect to be distinguished from the act 

 of him who does the same thing with a loaf of his 

 own, but by its consequences. From the consi- 

 deration of these consequences, we feel the most 

 perfect conviction, that, if people were not pre- 

 vented from gratifying their natural desires with 

 the loaves in the possession of others, the number 

 of loaves would universally diminish. This expe- 

 rience is the foundation of the laws relating to 

 property, and of the distinctions of virtue and 

 vice, in the gratification of desires otherwise per- 

 fectly the same. 



If the pleasure arising from the gratification of 

 these propensities were universally diminished in 

 vividness, violations of property would become 

 less frequent; but this advantage would be great- 

 ly overbalanced by the narrowing of the sources 

 of enjoyment. The diminution in the quantity 



