Ch. X. Of the Direction of our Charity. 371 



•founded expectations will sometimes be disap- 

 pointed ; and industry, prudence, and virtue not 

 only fail of their just reward, but be involved in 

 unmerited calamities. Those who are thus suffer- 

 ing in spite of the best-directed endeavours to 

 avoid it, and from causes which they could not 

 be expected to foresee, are the genuine objects 

 of charity. In relieving these, we exercise the 

 appropriate office of benevolence, that of miti- 

 gating the partial evils arising from general laws ; 

 and in this direction of our charity therefore we 

 need not apprehend any ill consequences. Such 

 objects ought to be relieved, according to our 

 means, liberally and adequately, even though 

 the worthless were in much more severe dis- 

 tress. 



When indeed this first claim on our benevolence 

 was satisfied, we might then turn our attention to 

 the idle and improvident; but the interests of 

 human happiness most clearly require, that the 

 relief which we afford them should not be abun- 

 dant. We may perhaps take upon ourselves, 

 with great caution, to mitigate the punishments 

 which they are suffering from the laws of nature, 

 but on no account to remove them entirely. They 

 are deservedly at the bottom in the scale of so- 

 ciety ; and if we raise them from this situation, 

 we not only palpably defeat the end of benevo- 

 lence, but commit a most glaring injustice to those 

 who are above them. They should on no account 

 be enabled to command so much of the neces- 



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