152 Mr. Buckle's Fallacies. [ix. 



statement of propositions ; but, on the contrary, the 

 loose and careless manner in which he, himself em- 

 ploys ordinary language throughout the discussion is 

 quite amazing. In the first place, he makes a verbally 

 unintelligible distinction between " intellectual truths " 

 and "moral truths." Scientifically speaking, there 

 can be no such thing as a " moral truth ; " for every 

 truth is a proposition, consisting of subject, predicate, 

 and copula ; and is uttered and recognised by the 

 intellect, not by the " moral instinct," which belongs 

 to the emotional part of our nature. It is the pro- 

 vince of intellect to think, of emotion to feel. Mr. 

 Buckle falls into exactly the same error in a singular 

 passage in his second volume, where he says : — 



" The emotions are as much a part of us as the under- 

 standing : they are as truthful; they are as likely to be right. 

 Though their view is different, it is not capricious. They 

 obey fixed laws ; they follow an orderly and uniform course ; 

 they run in sequences ; they have their logic a?id method of 

 inference." ^ 



All this is either strained metaphor or downright 

 nonsense. If it were true, what would be the use of 

 making any distinction at all between intellect and 

 feeling ^ If to feel is to judge, and to experience an 



1 Vol. ii. p. 502. 



