FIFTH DAY'S SITTING. 91 



however, after a most uncomfortable fashion, to flounder his 

 way through it, but not without giving one the impression 

 that he is more at home in studying the instincts and 

 habits of the beasts of the earth than in discussing the 

 wondrous nature and noble faculties of man. 



Lord C. Does he not define and explain what he means 

 by instinct and reason, and endeavour to point out the 

 separating line between them ? 



Homo. He does nothing of the sort, my Lord. In his 

 work on "The Origin of Species," however, referring to 

 instinct, he says, " An action which we ourselves should 

 require experience to enable us to perform, when performed 

 by an animal, more especially by a very young one, and 

 when performed by many individuals in the same way, 

 without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is 

 usually said to be instinctive." To this he adds, " I could 

 show that none of these characters of instinct are universal. 

 A little dose, as Pierre Huber expresses it, of judgment or 

 reason often comes into play, even in animals low in the 

 scale of nature." (Pp. 256, 257.) 



Lord C. Here we feel our need of definition. "What 

 does Mr. Darwin mean by " reason " ? Does he mean such 

 reason, or reasoning power, as man possesses ? Many 

 contend that the lower animals — dogs, for instance — possess 

 an inferior kind of reason, which helps, in some cases, to 

 guide them. When, for example, they have to decide 

 to which of two contending instincts they shall yield, 

 some would say that it is by an inferior kind of reason 

 that they decide ; others, that it is the more powerful 

 instinct that sways them. When, again, they imitate the 

 actions of man, apparently lio accomplish a certain end, e. g., 

 the opening of a door — a dog will use his paws for this 

 purpose — it will be said by some that they act from an 



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