118 HOMO V. DAEWIN. 



without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she con 

 sidered a moment, and then deliberately murdered it by 

 giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away 

 both together. This was the only known instance of her 

 ever having wilfully injured any game.' ' Here,' says Mr. 

 Darwin, ' we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the 

 retriever might have brought the wounded bird first, and 

 then returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two 

 wild ducks,' Precisely so ; if she had really reasoned she 

 would not have killed the duck. But two instinctive 

 impulses were working in her — one impelling her to bring 

 both birds, the other impelling her not to let either bird 

 escape ; and, not being able to reconcile the two by means 

 of reason, the latter instinct overpowered her habit of not 

 injuring the game. It is not by such instances that the 

 result of a wide induction respecting the difference between 

 the faculties of men and brutes can be overthrown. We 

 should have been, indeed, in no way surprised if Mr. Darwin 

 had been able to adduce cases far more difficult of explanation. 

 Nothing is better recognized than that inferior faculties, 

 when acting alone, acquire a perfection of development 

 which enables them in many cases to act even more effi- 

 ciently than higher faculties. A blind man will perceive by 

 the mere sense of touch that which the philosopher could 

 only observe by the aid of a microscope ; and a dog, by his 

 acute sense of smell, will surpass the "utmost exertions of 

 human sagacity in tracking his prey. Consequently, even 

 if it could be shown that animals perform certain actions 

 which men could only perform by the aid of reason, it would 

 by no means necessarily follow that animals perform them 

 by its aid. It would be perfectly conceivable that their 

 power was derived from the development of a lower and 

 diverse faculty to an extent of which men have on 



