124 , HOMO V. DARWIN. 



For, Firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take 

 pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount 

 of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for 

 them. The services may be of a definite and evidently 

 instinctive nature ; or there may be only a wish and readi- 

 ness, as with most of the higher social animals, to aid their 

 fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and 

 services are by no means extended to all the individuals of 

 the same species, only to those of the same association. 

 Secondly, as soon as the mental faculties had become 

 highly developed, images of all past actions and motives 

 would be incessantly passing through the brain of each 

 individual ; and that feeling of dissatisfaction which in- 

 variably results, as we shall hereafter see, from an unsatisfied 

 instinct, would arise, as often as it was perceived that the 

 enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to 

 some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither 

 enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid 

 impression. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such 

 as that of hunger, are in their nature of short duration ; 

 and after being satisfied are not readily or vividly recalled. 

 Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired, 

 and the wishes of the members of the same community 

 could be distinctly expressed, the common opinion, how 

 each member ought to act for the public good, would 

 naturally become to a large extent the guide to action. 

 But the social instincts would still give the impulse to act 

 for the good of the community, this impulse being strength- 

 ened, directed, and sometimes even deflected by public 

 opinion, the power of which rests, as we shall presently 

 see, on instinctive sympathy. Lastly, habit in the indi- 

 vidual would ultimately play a very important part in 

 guiding the conduct of each member ; for the social 



