FRrankianp.—On the Doctrine of Mind-Stuff. 205 
is clearly less than was all the material inside its orbit. If its original 
orbit had been such that, when at perihelion, it occupied such a position 
that, were it to return to the same place, on its return nearly all the matter 
would be outside its orbit, there would be scarcely any central attraction. 
Therefore, it would not come to that position, but must keep a long way 
from the centre; in other words, its orbit has become enormously more 
circular, or less eccentric. 
I will only, in this paper, call attention to the enormous mass of evi- 
dence that is accumulating respecting the change of forms, and the sudden 
appearance and disappearance of nebule ; proving that they are not distant 
universes, and also giving great probability to the theory of their origin, 
which this paper suggests. 
Arr. XVII.—On the Doctrine of Mind-Stuf. By Freprrick W. FRANKLAND. 
[Read before the Wellington Philosophical Society, 27th September, 1879.} 
Tue objects of the present paper are, to describe briefly a theory or doctrine 
of existence, expounded by the late Prof. Clifford, in an article ** On the 
Nature of Things in Themselves," but arrived at independently by several 
persons—amongst others by myself, as far back as the year 1870,—and to 
propound and assist toward the solution of a series of problems which arise 
in connection with this theory. 
The starting-point of the theory is the position, commonly associated 
with the names of Berkeley and Hume, that all the properties of material 
objects, as investigated by the physical and natural sciences, are capable of 
being analysed into possibilities of feeling, or relations among possibilities 
of feeling. Thus the redness of a rose is the possibility of a certain visual 
sensation, and the roundness of an orange is a complex of relations among 
the possibilities of certain visual, tactual, and muscular sensations. Grant- 
ing this position, it obviously follows that every assertion of physical science 
—every assertion, that is, respecting matter, force, or motion—is merely an 
assertion respecting possibilities of sensation or feeling. The truth of this 
position is demonstrated by a process of self-observation or introspection, 
and must be verified by each individual for himself. It is believed by the 
present writer that the conclusion arrived at cannot be resisted by any mind 
which performs the requisite process of self-analysis with perfect precision 
and faithfulness. 
The only concrete realities, therefore—the only “ things-in-themselves ” 
that we know of, are feelings. Psychology is the only concrete science. 
The word *'feeling'" is used here to denote any mental state whatever. 
