FnaxkLAND.—Un the Doctrine of Mind-Stuff. 207 
the language of metaphysics, an object (even if it be the farthest fixed star) 
is an abstraction the primary reference of which is to a concrete something 
inside the individual’s consciousness, namely a certain group of his own 
sensations; while its appearance of externality is derived from the fact that 
it also refers to actual or possible sensations outside his consciousness, 
namely in the consciousness of other beings who do or might exist. These 
other streams of consciousness, and not the earth, air, and sky, are the true 
‘“ External World" to each individual. The outsideness or externality of 
these ** other streams of consciousness,” of which each one among us infers 
the existence, and of the feelings composing them, appears to me to be 
very happily expressed in the term by which Prof. Clifford has proposed 
to denote them, namely the term eject. The minds of my readers are 
“ejects” to me, and my mind is an “eject” to them. The use of this term 
also places in marked contrast the genuine outsideness of these inferred 
existences with the pseudo-externality, so to speak, of the material universe. 
So far, nothing new has been enunciated. The thinkers of the school 
to which I belong, maintain that, paradoxical as some of the above asser- 
tions may sound, (for instance, the denial of the concrete existence of 
matter,) the common sense of mankind will bear us out in them, if only its 
deliverances be analysed and formulated with precision. It is only when 
we take a further step that our doctrine parts company with the belief of 
the uninstructed. This further step is taken in answer to the question: 
* Are there ejects which form no part of any consciousness? Are there 
` non-personal ejects?” and to the further question: “If so, what is their 
nature?" | 
Are there ejects which form no part of any consciousness? In other 
words, besides the consciousnesses of intelligent beings, each with its rich 
phantasmagoria of sensations, and its varied wealth of ideas and emotions, 
are there any real existences ? My readers will immediately reply, ** To be 
sure. There is the earth, with all the material objects on its surface, there 
are the sun, moon, and stars, and, in fact, the whole material universe 2" 
This, however, would be a reply which would not meet the question at all. 
For, as indicated in the first portion of this paper, if any one will honestly 
examine the nature of his conceptions respecting material objects, he will 
find that they resolve themselves wholly into conceptions of possibilities of 
sensation in himself and in other sentient beings who do, or might, exist: and, 
if all these possibilities of sensation be abstracted, he will be much puzzled 
io attach a meaning to the assertion that there is a residuary existence 
behind. It will not suffice, therefore, to answer the question by merely 
affirming the existence of a material universe: we must also state whether 
we believe that, besides the possibilities of sensation, and the relations 
