910 Transactions.—M iscellaneous. 
Professor Wundt, the eminent German physiologist, and perhaps by others, 
we may claim as much originality as any of the exponents of the doctrine, 
and priority over most. 
I now turn to some of the problems which are suggested by the general 
theory of things we have been considering. 
First: In what relation does the doctrine of Omnisentiency or Mind- 
Stuff stand to the various theories which have been propounded for 
explaining, on the principles of rational mechanics, the phenomena of the 
physical universe ? In what relation does it stand to the theories of atoms, 
ether, ultramundane corpuscles, ring-vortices, and the like? Now, in the 
first place, it does not either exclude or supersede them. There is nothing 
in the doctrine of Mind-Stuff incompatible with any of these mechanical 
theories. The theories in question are one and all of them statements of 
quantitative relations among possibilities of feeling, and are not in any way 
concerned with the noumenal realities on which these possibilities depend. 
The universe of matter is a complex of possibilities of feeling, and these 
possibilities are found to stand in certain quantitative relations to one 
another. These relations are of two orders,—relations of sequence and 
relations of co-existence. The former are believed to depend, without 
exception, on causal relations—relations spoken of as the laws of nature;— 
the latter are space-relations, and may be described as facts of structure. 
All the mechanical theories I have alluded to, therefore, and indeed all 
mechanical theories that can be framed, are affirmations either of mechanical 
laws or faets of structure, or both. Setting out from the relations of 
sequence and facts of structure which we observe to exist among the 
possibilities of sensation which constitute the material world, the physical 
investigator does one of two things. He either infers, by a complete induc- 
tion, the existence of such and such causal relations, and then deduces 
facts of structure which are not capable of being observed; or, he assumes 
the existence of certain facts of structure, and perhaps also of certain 
causal relations, and shows that by known causal relations these will lead 
to the observed facts of structure. In the former ease, his process is one 
of scientific demonstration, in the latter he constructs a scientific hypothesis. 
To the former category belongs the reasoning by which we infer that matter 
consists of molecules (in other words, that its structure is discontinuous), and 
that there is an ether; to the latter, belong such hypotheses as those of ring- 
vortices and ultra-mundane corpuscles. But now, observe, we are throughout 
dealing with quantitative relations among abstract possibilities. The whole 
of mechanical science deals with such relations. It is in no way coneerned 
with the inner qualitative nature of the real existences on which ‘these 
possibilities depend. These real existences are aggregations of Mind-Stuff. 
