919 Transactions.—M iscellaneous. 
Now it is my ambition to follow out the line of thought here indicated. 
It would be impossible to do so fully within the limits of a single paper, but 
a beginning may be made. In the first place I desire to supply what I 
conceive to be a serious omission in Professor Clifford’s enumeration of the 
data respecting Mind-Stuff which the “future theorist” has at his disposal. 
Feelings not only have relations of contiguity or nextness in space, and of 
sequenee in time, but they also have two other quantitative aspects of very 
great importance, namely degrees of intensity and differences of volume. We 
are conscious that sensations differ in intensity; thus an acute pain is 
felt to be a more intense sensation than a faint smell. Also, we are con- 
scious that sensations of about equal intensity differ in something we call 
volume or massiveness: thus a sensation of general weariness, though perhaps 
felt to be of about equal intensity with a particular ache, is distinguished 
(apart from its qualitative difference) as possessing greater mass or volume. 
Lastly, we know that there exist causal relations among our feelings. Thus 
the group of ideas* characterized as the realization of a danger is followed 
by the emotion of terror, and the constancy of the sequence indicates that 
we have here to deal with a causal relation. Hence the data we possess 
are these :—a complex of feelings perpetually undergoing transformations, 
causal relations between successive feelings, relations of contiguity or next- 
ness among a few of the synchronous ones (though this appears to be an 
exceptional phase of psychic structure, only to be found, as far as I am 
aware, among simultaneous visual impressions which co-exist in a space or 
manifoldness of two dimensions), qualitative resemblances and differences, 
variations in intensity, and variations in volume or mass. These are the 
materials from which we must construct our conception, save as to certain 
spots necessarily a very dim one, of the noumenal world. And these are 
the materials which we must connect, in the best way we ean, with the 
elementary factors of our conception of the world of phenomena. We 
must endeavour to establish a correspondence between feelings, their causal 
and topical relations, their intensities and volumes, on the one hand, and 
the dynamical conceptions of mass, momentum, force, energy, etc., on the 
other. Now, as a preliminary to the working out of this correspondence it 
will perhaps be advisable to take a brief survey of the ultimate dynamical 
conceptions, and of their relations to one another. 
see, that space may be not only not homogeneous in ultimate structure, but not even 
infutely divisible. It may consist of indivisible units. In that case there would be such 
as absolute magnitude, and measuring would be reduced to counting. The space- 
unit i ihen be the analogue of the Mind-Stuff 
* An idea is merely a combination of inni up which are severally faint 
copies of more vivid primary feelings. In the present case there is included also an unique 
ent called belief alluded to in an earlier portion of this paper. 
