Ricumonp.—Reply to Mr. Frankland's paper on ** Mind-Stuf." 215 
menal world must be paralleled by a nexus, at least equally complex, of 
synchronous relations in the noumenal world. But the complexity of the 
latter may be greater by any amount than that of the former. There may be 
facts of strueture in the noumenal world which have no representatives, so 
to speak, in the world of phenomena. It has always seemed to me probable 
that this was the truth which Spinoza had in his mind when he said that 
extension was only one out of a perhaps infinite number of attributes 
possessed by the universal substance. The possibility in question shows 
that there is nothing in the doctrine of Mind-Stuff per se—Professor Clifford 
to the contrary notwithstanding—to negative the belief either of the 
spiritualist or of the theologian. It may or may not be the tendency 
of physiologieal research to exclude the conceptions with which these two 
elasses of thinkers are concerned, but this exclusion can certainly not be 
the result of an acceptance in its most general form of tbe doctrine here 
described. On the other hand, there is equally little in it to encourage or 
lend assistance to theological belief. The proposition that there is a dim 
quasi-sentiency pervading the world, is as far removed as possible from the 
proposition that there are intelligences unconnected with any brain, and 
this latter proposition, which is the essence of all spiritualism and theology, 
can derive no support from the former. In regard to theology, then, the 
doctrine of Mind-Stuff is neutral. It may rather be described as monistic 
than as materialistic. It affirms that there is only one Existence—that 
which Herbert Spencer* speaks of as the **Substance of Mind’’—and that 
the supposed dualism of matter and spirit is an illusion. 
Arr. XVIIL.—A Reply to Mr. Frankland's paper on ** The Doctrine of Mind- 
Stuf.” By C. W. Ricamonp, a Judge of the Supreme Court of New 
[Read ns the Wellington Philosophical Society, 1st November, 1879.] 
Mr. FmawkLAND's paper,t as suggesting a Monistic theory of the Universe, 
is in entire accordance with a prevailing tendency of thought amongst 
physical philosophers. To close the long contest of Spiritualist with 
Materialist by cancelling the difference between mind and matter appears to 
many persons at the present day an enterprise of which the ultimate success 
is certain. ‘‘ One substance," to quote the words of Professor Bain, ** with 
- two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a double- 
* To a hint thrown out in the concluding paragrap ph of Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
chapter on “The Substance of Mind,” I feel that I owe the suggestion of the doctrine. 
1 Art. XVIL., ante. 
