Ricumonp.—Reply to Mr. Frankland's paper on ** Mind-Stuf." — 917 
tendency, it is removed by the proposal to transfer to the description and 
investigation of mental phenomena such notions as “mass,” “motion,” 
** velocity," * momentum." To me, I confess, the proposal appears desti- 
tute of possible meaning. The notion of extension is obviously involved in 
every one of these terms. In our **matter-moulded forms of speech" all 
these ideas are applied metaphorically to spiritual existence, and the things 
of the pure intellect. But we are conscious of the metaphor. We speak 
of a massive intellect; but would not gravely affirm that Cuvier's under- 
standing weighed precisely 64 ozs. Because we talk of ** a rapid intuition," 
we do not suppose ourselves able to compute, in terms of space as well as 
time, the speed of those glances of the mind compared with which ** the 
tempest itself lags behind, and the swift-winged arrows of light." The Mate- 
rializing School, in treating of the emotions, in which our bodily frame 
co-operates with our mental constitution, often make use, with marked 
predilection, of language properly applicable only in the field of Physics,— 
and we hear continually of ‘‘ waves," **currents," ** vibrations," and the 
like. But into the proper region of the intellect they do not venture on 
importing the idea of space. Professor Bain, in his ** Compendium of 
Mental and Moral Science,” recognizes, in limine, the grand division of 
human knowledge into the two departments of Matter and Mind,—or, as 
he prefers to call them, Object and Subject. ‘‘ The department of the 
Object, or Object-world, is,” he says, ‘‘ exactly circumscribed by one pro- 
perty, extension. The world of Subject-experience is devoid of this 
property.” 
Mr. Frankland adduces the sensation of general weariness as an instance 
of a mental phenomenon, involving the perception of volume or massive- 
ness; which includes the idea of extension. But this is a physical sensa- 
tion, and no instance of a purely mental experience. Our own limbs and 
body are as much a portion of the external world as any other part of it. 
Unquestionably the sense of weariness is always, more or less, definite in 
extent. We may feel our legs tired, or our arms and back, or tired all over. 
Just in the same way we recognize in sensation, more or less exactly, the 
extent of a wound or burn. To prove what is wanted, an instance must be 
found of a purely mental emotion or operation, unconnected with any 
corporeal feeling. But we are certainly not conscious of the extent in 
square surface, or cubic space, of our love, hatred, remorse, regret; or of 
any process or result of the reasoning power. To these, terms of intension, 
which are dynamical, not material, may be applied; but never terms of © 
extension. 
But I pass on to consider the validity of the induction—shall I call it, 
or the fidelity of the intuition—upon which the new doctrine is to be 
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