Ricumonp.—Reply to Mr. Frankland's paper on ** Mind-Stuf." 221 
he has, of course, a right to discard any part of their doctrine which he 
conceives to be unsound. But the disciple often finds himself involved, by 
a partial departure from the established creed of his sect, in unexpected 
inconsistency. With this preface, I wish to cite a few lines from Professor 
Bain’s ** Compendium" (Appendix, p. 98). After asserting that, ** Every- 
thing that we know, or can conceive, may be termed a quality or attribute," 
he pertinently inquires, what is left to stand for * substance ?'—and answers 
the query as follows:—'* One way out of the difficulty is to postulate 
an unknown and unknowable entity, underlying, and in some mysterious 
way holding together, the various attributes. We are said to be driven by 
an intuitive and irresistible tendency to make this assumption ; which 
intuition is held to justify us in such an extreme measure. There is an 
unknowable substance, ‘‘matter,” the subject of the attribute inertia, and 
of all the special modes of the different kinds of matter—gold, marble, 
water, oxygen, and the rest. The same hypothetical unknown entity is 
expressed in another antithesis—the nowmenon as against the phenomenon; 
what is, in contrast to what appears." Now, Mr. Frankland seems to think 
that in the particular class of experiences which he has selected he has 
evaded the difficulty insisted upon by Bain. Self-consciousness has given 
him entrance behind the scenes of external Nature which he can now con- 
template ab intra. He needs not “ to postulate an unknown and unknow- 
able entity," since he is himself the entity observed. In the co-related 
phenomena of intellect and brain he seems to recognize himself as self- 
eonscious substance, simultaneously cognizant of his own being, of the 
material organism with which it is allied, and of the nexus between the 
two. This is his key to the enigma of the Kosmos. If I interpret him 
rightly, he has at all events emerged from Phenomenalism, and may be 
welcomed over by the Ontologists. Differing, as I do myself, from Professor 
Bain, I cannot here press his authority upon Mr. Frankland. In regard to 
the idea of ** substance," Mr. Frankland is clearly at liberty to reject Bain's 
characteristic attempt to explain away a notion which human thought can- 
not dispense with, and will ever insist upon supplying. Nor should I 
quarrel with the application, to mind, of the term “ substance," which is 
properly a metaphysical notion. The use of the term in theology is familiar. 
Spinoza regards God as a substance. But every argument which I have 
adduced to show that the cerebral changes are not effects of mental causes 
within our consciousness is also valid to prove that they are not accidents 
or motions of our own mental substance. This supposed substance is, be 
it remembered, ex hypothesi, a self-conscious entity, and could not be 
ignorant of its own vibration, or even of its own capability of vibration. 
Besides which, as I have already urged, the changes, or vibrations, are 
