THE SYNTHETICAL METHOD. 471 



been made, to rest contented with a simple exposition of 

 those principles which every naturalist admits to be in- 

 controvertible truths, — such as the omnipotence of God, 

 and the unity of our sentient principle. That mind must 

 be lamentably warped by scholastic prejudices or scepti- 

 cal theories, which can doubt such facts as these. The only 

 assumption, with which I am likely to be taxed, is that of 

 the existence of secondary operative causes distinct from 

 matter, or at least not of necessity dependent upon it. As 

 a promise was held forth that I should resume this sub- 

 ject, my reasons shall now be given for having taken that 

 much disputed position, the defence of which will inevi- 

 tably lead me to consider the true distinction between 

 man and other animals. On a question so hackneyed 

 nothing new ought to be expected here, and I feel that it 

 would be ridiculous in me to attempt any thing of the 

 kind. Nay, this point, so often debated, would never have 

 been handled by me, had I not been sensible that many 

 expressions in the preceding pages are liable to miscon- 

 ception. My aim therefore is not to launch forth any 

 novel system of Metaphysics, but only to explain briefly. 



First, my chief reasons for adopting, with a firm con- 

 viction of its truth, the doctrine of the immateriality of all 

 operative causes. 



Secondly, my chief reasons for believing that whatever 

 relates to the sentient principles of the lower animals must 

 ever in this world be seen, as through a glass, darkly. 

 With these objects in view, I shall simplify, as much as I 

 possibly can, the metaphysical nature of an inquiry so con- 

 trary to the usual researches of Entomologists, by compre- 

 hending it in a classification of the chief hypotheses that 

 have been proposed on the sensations of animals. The 



