TRUE AN]) FALSE ANALOGIES. 241 



Other. This instance of analogy^ which must come 

 home to the comprehension of the most unpractised 

 naturalist, may be cited as one of the innumerable proofs 

 of the universality of symbolical representation; a prin- 

 ciple which extends from the very highest groups of 

 ponderable matter, down to the series in which in- 

 dividual species follow one another. We know not, in 

 fact, which to admire most, — the vast and unlimited 

 extension of the principal itself, or the simplicity of 

 those laws by which it is regulated. 



CHAP. II. 



THE FOURTH PROPOSITION CONSIDERED. THE PRIJIART TVPES 



OF NATURE. 



(297') In the last chapter we endeavoured to elucidate 

 the truth of the three first laws, upon which the 

 System of Nature, or, in other words, natural classifica- 

 tion, is framed. We now come to our fourth proposition, 

 which maintains that the primary divisions of every cir- 

 cular group are characterised by definite peculiarities of 

 form, structure, and economy ; which, under diversified 

 modifications, can he traced throughout the animal king- 

 dom; and are, therefore, to he regarded as the pkimary 

 TYPES OP NATURE. Upou tliis generalisation we have 

 not been enabled to receive any assistance from the la- 

 bours of our predecessors, since we are not aware of its 

 having hitherto been hinted at. 



(298.) It would seem to follow, as the next stage of 

 induction, after gaining the law of representation, that 

 this representation necessarily involves the prevalence of 

 certain definite forms, following each other in a uniform 

 series, and, therefore, capable, from these circumstances, 

 of a general definition. But, unfortunately, the few 

 eminent naturalists who have prosecuted these higher 

 objects of the science have limited their studies, for the 



R 



