i88 THEPHILOSOPHY 



hemlock. As foon as he compares, he judges of the relation be- 

 tween two ideas. In proportion as thefe comparifons or judgments 

 are repeated, he acquires, by habit, a greater facility in making them. 

 He can judge of different degrees of pleafure and pain. Hence, 

 when he feels uneafy, he recals pleafant fenfations which are paft, 

 and wiihes for their return. This is the origin of defire and want. 

 Memory is the recolledion only of what is paft ; but, when the ideas 

 of objects prefent themfelves in fo lively a manner, that he believes 

 they are adlually prefent, this operation of the mind is called imagi- 

 nation. Being limited to the ufe of one fenfe, he would learn to 

 diftinguilh fmells with greater accuracy than beings endowed with 

 more fources of information. Abftradion is the feparation of two 

 ideas which have a natural connedion. By refleding that the ideas 

 of pain and pleafure refult from different modifications of his ex- 

 iftence, he contradts the habit of feparaling them, and thus acquires 

 abftrad: notions. To our ftatue, a violet is a particular idea only; 

 ■confequently, all his abftradions are limited to different degrees of 

 pleafure and pain. The fucceffion of fenfations will give him fome 

 faint ideas of number, of paft, and of future time. Duration is an 

 idea purely relative, and changes according to the rapidity or flow- 

 nefs of our perceptions. Our ftatue is incapable of diftinguiftiing 

 dreams, or a lively imagination, from real fenfations. By the aid 

 of memory he recognifes his identity, and knows his prefent from 

 his paft condition. From thefe remarks it appears, that a man li- 

 mited to one fenfe is capable of acquiring the rudiments of every 

 human faculty, and that thefe faculties are only extended by the ad- 

 dition of other fenfes. Nearly the fime acquifitions would be made, 

 if a man were limited to any of the other fenfes. 



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