XXL. New Zealand Institute. 
Ceylon and Australasia, vid Torres Strait, is Singapore. Proceeding 
by the westward route, a ship passes Ascension and the Falkland 
Islands ; or, if, when the canal is completed, by the Panama route, 
Bermuda, Jamaica, and the Islands of Fiji. 
It is a matter of interest to observe that in most of the British 
possessions, as in Australia and New Zealand, there is a local supply 
of coal available for marine and naval purposes, 
Turning now to the map of the world before you, you will see 
how intimately Australia and New Zealand, in common with all parts 
of the empire, are concerned in the defence of British naval stations 
and in the efficiency of the squadrons which operate therefrom. You 
will also understand that it is of paramount importance that these sta- 
tions should be rendered thoroughly secure. They cannot fulfil the 
conditions required of them if their anchorages, and the depóts and 
repairing establishments they contain, are not protected against hostile 
occupation, capture, or destruction, during the absence of the squad- 
rons they are intended to support. It is, I know, often said that the. 
defence of these stations should be dependent upon our fleet, but this 
view will not bear examination. The depóts are provided to enable 
our vessels of war to command the sea, and those vessels cannot possess 
the freedom of action which is necessary for the performance of their 
duties if they are either tied down to particular places, or are obliged - 
to manceuvre with a view to the protection of those -places. The 
Admiral on a station requires his ships for the defence of our com- 
merce at sea, and he cannot detach them for the purpose of guarding 
particular ports. If our naval squadrons be employed in defending 
their depóts, we should (as I have often pointed out) be using the- 
fleet to maintain the depots, instead of the depéts to maintain the 
fleet. Our naval depóts, therefore, should be rendered secure in them- 
selves and independent of the action of the fleet. They must be 
fortified and garrisoned. If so defended, we are enabled to hold 
them absolutely for the use of ourselves and our allies ; and our war 
cruisers thus supported, and acting along the maritime routes of our 
commerce, can afford effective protection to that commerce. If 
unfortified, the depóts would during the absence of our squad- 
rons be as much the property of the enemy as of ourselves, 
and would supply to hostile vessels the means of affacking our 
commerce. 
Remember the case of the “ Alabama." You well know what 
losses the mercantile marine of the Northern States suffered during 
the civil war in America, from the “ Alabama” and other ships of 
that class cruising about on the tracks of commerce, and capturing 
aud burning merchant vessels carrying the United States flag. Yous © 
