xl 



Appendix. 



Mount 



and vividly enjoyed and depicted a glorious vision of rich achievements to be 

 accomplished ; he taught that the way to realize such grand results was, in the 

 first place, to tread a humble path of patient inquiry; and, lastly, he 

 attempted, though he could not succeed in, the construction a priori of a logic 



of experimental discovery. 



Without injustice to either Aristotle or Bacon we may say that the Logic 

 of Scientific Investigation is a recent addition to mental science. It has been 

 hitherto developed exclusively by English thinkers. Archbishop Whately 

 was the first who indicated a genuine analysis of the inductive generalization. 

 Dr. Whewell is the historian of the Inductive Sciences ; and he has copiously 

 treated of their philosophy. He did, doubtless, exaggerate the prowess of the 

 Intellect in its relation to Experience; but it may be fairly questioned 

 whether his critics of the opposite school have not erred as widely in the 

 contrary direction. It is characteristic of the tendency of Dr. Whewell s 

 mind, that he suggested the avowed innovation of giving a new definition to 

 the word Induction, and assigning a new reference to its etymology. He 

 urges that the inductive result is obtained by means of a mental conception 



facts — as 



Mars 



Whewell 



the appropriate conception.* The suggestion, I need scarcely say, has not 

 been adopted. We must not omit mentioning here, though it will suffice to 

 merely mention, Sir John Herschel's instructive " Discourse on the Study of 

 Natural Philosophy." John Stuart Mill, who has recently passed away while 

 still fully exercising the matured vigor of his profound intellect, accomplished 

 the task which Bacon somewhat prematurely attempted, and which has been 

 regarded by many as impracticable — that of constructing a logic of scientific 

 investigation. Mr. Mill defines Induction thus (System of Logic, III. ii- 1) : 

 " That operation of the mind by which we infer, that what we know to be true 

 in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases, which resemble the 

 former in certain assignable respects. In other words," it is added, u Induc- 

 tion is the process by which we conclude, that what is true of certain 

 individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain 

 times, will be true under similar circumstances at all times. 1 ' In another 

 passage the same author says (III. iii. 1) : " Induction properly so called . . . 

 may, then, be summarily defined as Generalization from Experience. It 

 consists in inferring from some individual instances, in which a phenomenon 

 is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain class ; namely, 



* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Aphorisms concerning Science, No. 13 ; and 

 XI. v. 3, 



