248 Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. [December, 1905. 
definition, that one is tempted to say that the whole of the 
examination affair, z.e., all the chapters II. to IV. are an addition. 
So far about the Logic portion. 
The Philosophy portion has its beginning in the second Sitra of 
the first chapter. The first Sutra of Chapter I., as has been already 
said, gives the objects and reasons of the work. And these 
objects and reasons seem to be all secular. There was no 
need for a second enunciation of the objects and reasons. But 
the second Sitra again enunciates them. And in this case, 
they are philosopical and spiritual. Vacaspatimisra puts the 
two together in one section, and calls the section “objects and 
reasons.” The commentators have tried to reconcile this double 
enunciation of objects and reasons, but without success. The 
only reasonable explanation of this double enunciation seems to 
be that some later writer has interpolated the second Sttra with 
a view to add philosophical sections to the work. The second 
Sutra contains topics which are not enumerated in the first, and 
the thoughtful reader is struck with the introduction of new 
matter so early as in the second Sitra. These topics are misery, 
birth, activity and fault together with “apavarga.” The intro- 
duction of these new topics is defended by saying that they fall 
under the subdivisions of the second topic, in the first Sutra, 
namely, ‘“ objects of true knowledge.” ‘“ The object of true knowl- 
edge” is a topic which is so vast that all the topics of the world 
may come under its subdivisions. And, as a result of this, the 
interpolator has tampered with the definition of prameya (Sitra I. 
1:9) which is virtually an enumeration of its subdivisions, and put 
in five new topics into it. That the prameyastitra at one time was 
different from what it is now, is apparent from the statement of 
Haribhadrasiri, a Jain writer, who in his saddarsana samuccaya 
describes the prameyasttra in the following terms :— 
FAY QiaASea Teifeagarta ¥, (Bibliotheca Indica edition), 
or, as in the Benares edition, 34a WIaeeTa qsitegarta yw. The 
order of words is different; sukha or happiness seems to have 
been included in the old prameyasttra Sukha finds no place in 
that Sutra now and in Chapter [V., Ahnika I., the Section 13 on 
the examination of duhkha, reduces sukha into duhkha, and is not 
prepared to admit sukha as a separate subdivision of prameya. 
But from Haribhadra’s statement we find that sukha was there at 
some early time. Now the question is, who changed the Sitras 
and why? The answer is not far to seek. In a work on Logic 
prameya, as a topic, must comein. But Logic does not require a 
long enumeration of prameyas and an elaborate examination of 
their details, which are essential in philosophy. So the author 
who wanted to convert a logical treatise into a system of 
philosophy, and who is responsible for the interpolation of the 
second Stitra is also responsible for this alteration in the 
prameyasttra The logical treatise was an ancient Hindu 
treatise, and Hindus never took an ultra-pessimistic view of the 
world. Sukha is the ultimate goal of the Mimamsakas, of the 
