Moral Mesponsibility. 29 



nothing of, or disown it. It has thns to give way to the 

 agent whom it should govern, and the man proves superior 

 to his authority. And as thus no authority, even though 

 divine, is adequately operative upon those for whose con- 

 trol it is most required, the principle, as affecting morality, 

 must be dismissed as inefficacious and invalid ; for what we 

 want, and what is indispensable, is a principle of universal, 

 not of partial application or force. 



But the moral efficacy upon conduct of the theory of a 

 future state of rewards and punishments forms another 

 essential part of the religious sanction, as it has been called ; 

 and has been so commonly deemed indispensable as a basis 

 of moral government, that it demands careful consideration, 

 notwithstanding that it involves that of the authority of a 

 Deity — which, as regards the prevention of immorality, we 

 have already been obliged to relinquish. Let us therefore 

 here, for the sake of argument, admit the authority of a 

 Deity as the only one competent to effect a post mortem 

 rectification of mundane conditions, and examine whether 

 this doctrine, which includes the whole relevant part of the 

 religious sanction, combines the indispensable conditions of 

 consistency with itself and universal efficacy upon men. 



"When we consider that any theory which demands a state 

 of future existence, as necessary to provide an opportunity 

 of satisfying or completing justice in the administration of 

 this life, actually and essentially involves the rash, not to 

 say impious assumption of injustice in the Divine govern- 

 ment here; and also, in addition, of a radical change to an 

 entirely opposite treatment hereafter ; we cannot but acknow- 

 ledge that a theory of morality which should require such a 

 basis, would be subversive not only of itself, but also of a 

 belief in two of the most important attributes of the 

 Deity — justice and unchangeableness. 



To hold that God does or permits evil that good, may 

 come, seems to. me the very essence of blasphemy ; for to 

 assert that he cannot effect all good without any evil, 

 amounts to a denial of his omniscience or omnipotence : and to 

 say that he iv ill not, is even worse; being a positive imputation 

 of malevolence. And if in man such conduct can only be 

 excused by stupid ignorance, its culpability should augment 

 in proportion to knowledge. Inconsistency thus seems 

 inherent in the theory. 



Still, to secure a universal basis for moral principles is an 

 object of so much importance, that certain efficacy might 



