30 Moral Responsibility. 



atone even for such inconsistency as I have just exposed, 

 and would lead me to suspect an error in the argument ; 

 which, however, would be proportionately strengthened 

 should the contrary appear. I will therefore consider the 

 effects of the theory of a future life upon present morality. 



It seems proper to remember that all the evidence for the 

 probability of this theory, is purely traditional, and 

 derived from a comparatively barbarous ignorant age ; and 

 we know that opinions, even among its advocates, have 

 always been divided as to its possible reality and conditions. 



It seems clear that any theory at variance with experi- 

 ence, and of which all verification and tangible proof is so 

 indefinitely postponed, can at best have no more than a 

 doubtful influence even upon the speculative and curious, 

 and cannot be supposed to govern the impulsive busy mass. 

 The motives to conduct afforded by any such considerations 

 must necessarily be weak in exact proportion to their dis- 

 tance and uncertainty, as compared with present, pressing, 

 felt wants. We all know that force acts inversely as the 

 square of the distance. So the distance or frequency of the 

 sittings of courts of justice, determines in miles or in hours 

 the amount of their moral effect. Altogether the whole sub- 

 ject of post mortem conditions is necessarily so obscure, that 

 as regards motives to conduct, it can furnish none to com- 

 pete in vividness and strength with present, potent tempta- 

 tions, and immediate urgent necessities, which obliterate all 

 distant and merely supposititious considerations. Whenever 

 the two classes of motives compete, those which are least 

 distant and most certain, are inevitably victorious. If 

 we find that facts corroborate this opinion, the inefhcacy 

 upon conduct of the theory of a future life will be substan- 

 tially established, and my argument of the inconsistency of 

 the doctrine practically confirmed. 



It is surely incontestable that there is a proportion, and 

 probably everywhere about the same, of men of every 

 religion and in every country, who are really good, and 

 another of those who are bad ; the one class comprising 

 those whose conduct forms the criterion of the local moral 

 code ; and the other, those who fall below and violate it. 

 The precise relative proportions of the two classes are imma- 

 terial to my argument, but their existence is indubitable. A 

 part, and a part only, of those who are good, inevitably pro- 

 fess the local religion whatever it be ; for those well inclined, 

 unless unusually critical, eagerly adopt the reasons cur- 



