32 Moral Responsibility. 



parents ; and in partially civilised times and countries, the 

 results have been those fearful reciprocal persecutions and 

 "wholesale massacres which constituted far more pernicious 

 evils than any pestilence or famine ; inasmuch as in addition 

 to the cruel destruction of innocent thousands by deaths 

 often devised as the most painful, the bitterest hatred and 

 rancour were excited and aggravated to an extreme to which 

 no other known cause has ever proved adequate. Such 

 effects can only be considered as distinctly antagonistic to 

 all genuine morality. The radical difference and even oppo- 

 sition thus shown to exist between the religious and moral 

 sanctions, teaches us that their aims and functions should be 

 entirely dissociated ; that their connection is illegitimate, and 

 their offspring therefore an abortion or a monstrosity. 



It may still be said, however, that man is responsible to 

 society ; and this might hold while his acts affect society, 

 and he not only acknowledges but bows to its authority. 

 But society takes no cognizance of many of his acts, and 

 very imperfectly prevents what it knows and disapproves. 

 And who can deny his right to throw off its authority when 

 he has the power ? It is because he actually does this when- 

 ever he lists, failing to perceive that his highest interests are 

 best served by yielding to the restrictions which society 

 imposes on each for the benefit of all, that we are driven to 

 seek a more universal and effective basis for morality. The 

 fact that any mere authority can be contravened with 

 impunity, is fatal to the efficacy and validity of the principle 

 in any shape or form. 



To what then can man be responsible ? and in what 

 consists his obligation to virtuous conduct ? Let us analyse 

 his position and the facts. When man is tempted to com- 

 mit a social offence, or any act whatever, and regards solely 

 his object or himself, he experiences no check but what is 

 imposed by direct physical obstacles ; which however are 

 often wanting, and the act is forthwith completed. If, 

 however, he abstain, it is in every case either from mere 

 habit, which avails nothing in unusual circumstances, or 

 from a consideration of the probable direct or indirect 

 consequences of the act* This I think must be evident. 



* " First I conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to 

 do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or 

 abstaining necessarily follows the present thought of the good or evil conse- 

 quence to himself." — Hobbes's Works, vol. iv., p. 272. 



