■ 34 Moral Responsibility. ' 



the apprehension of consequences — experience unfortunately 

 proves to be too often unfulfilled ; were it otherwise we 

 should not have to search for a rule of conduct. But the 

 fact that men with knowledge and sagacity most seldom err, 

 while those without such qualities constantly do so, is a 

 strong argument for the validity of my principle ; while the 

 rapid and wide extension of knowledge, and the daily- 

 increasing appreciation of it, afford solid ground for hope 

 that it will eventually be universally recognised. That the 

 necessary consequences of every act are morally or indirectly 

 appropriate, requires to be known and thoroughly under- 

 stood ; indeed, in comparison with the due apprehension of 

 this fact all other knowledge is futile and worthless. 



For the whole of his conduct man thus is evidently not re- 

 sponsible to any authority, but strictly amenable to physical 

 consequences ; and the degree of his comprehension of them 

 is the measure of his obligation. Responsibility is a phrase 

 scarcely appropriate in such a connection, although suffi- 

 ciently intelligible. Responsibility then, or amenability to 

 natural consequences, is co-extensive with the power of 

 action, and ignorance of them does not exempt from infallible 

 retribution. Obligation is measurable by the extent of 

 apprehension of those consequences ; and social penalties 

 partially remedy ignorance of them by adding more per- 

 ceptible unmistakable penalties to those natural ones 

 which are generally overlooked. With society, ignorance of 

 social penalties is seldom, though too often, admitted as a 

 ground of exemption ; but with inexorable nature ignorance 

 is never admitted as an excuse. Society, however, thus indi- 

 rectly remedies ignorance of natural consequences, by teach- 

 ing offenders the knowledge of them, which they evidently 

 want. Man is exactly recompensed by natural consequences, 

 for observing or violating the laws which experience dictates as 

 necessary to preserve his life, health, and general well-being; 

 and liable to social consequences for observing or violating 

 those prescribed by the society in which he lives. This social 

 responsibility is only rendered necessary by the deficiency of 

 his comprehension of physical consequences, by his general 

 ignorance of natural effects ; and thus partially makes up the 

 difference between his obligation and his responsibility. In 

 nature he is irresistibly impelled to maintain his existence 

 and health if possible ; he is provided more or less ade- 

 quately with means ; and he is with perfect measure 

 rewarded for wise attention, or punished for disregard, to 



