46 Moral Responsibility. 



I have contended that one condition only is still wanting 

 to man, to enable him to perfect his morality ; and that is, 

 full knowledge of the natural consequences and of the causes 

 of his acts. I have pointed out also that his morality is 

 always proportioned to such knowledge. The obvious lesson, 

 therefore, which I deduce from the whole is that, to extend 

 and disseminate knowledge (and most of all among the igno- 

 rant and vicious) as widely and completely as lies in our 

 utmost means and power, is not only our best policy and 

 highest virtue, but our most sacred and imperative duty. 



These principles may be formulated thus : — ■ 



1st. — That every event, physical or moral, is the necessary 

 result of its antecedents.* 



2nd. — That moral power is simply indirect physical force. 



3rd. — That the highest interest of the individual and that 

 of society, cannot really conflict, but are absolutely 

 identical in every instance. 



4th. — That man's knowledge is the measure of his obliga- 

 tion to virtue, and of his prospect of reward ; while his 

 responsibility or certain amenability to the necessary and 

 appropriate consequences of his acts, is coextensive with 

 his power of action ; and 



5th.— That virtue is therefore really its own sole and 

 ample reward. 



* Hobbes has I think conclusively shown that any sufficient cause, must 

 be also a necessary cause. " I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which 

 "nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The 

 " same is also a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause 

 " shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was 

 "needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if 

 "it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then 

 " is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect 

 "necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that what- 

 soever is produced, is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced 

 "hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and 

 " therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated. 



" Lastly, that ordinary definition of a, free agent, namely, that a free agent 

 "is that, which, when all things are -present which are needful to produce 

 " the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is 

 " nonsense ; being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that 

 " is to say, necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow." Hobbes's Works, 

 vol. iv., pp. 274, 275. I cannot but consider that the succinct wisdom of 

 these weighty words is unsurpassed, and their scope must be startling to 

 whoever will ponder them as they deserve. 



