xxu. 



New Zealand Institute. 



Ceylon and Australasia, via Torres Strait, is Singapore. Proceeding 

 by the westward route, a ship passes Ascension and the Falkland 

 Islands ; or, if, when the canal is completed, by the Panama route, 

 Bermuda, Jamaica, and the Islands of Fiji. 



It is a matter of interest to observe that in most of the British 

 possessions, as in Australia and New Zealand, there is a local supply 

 of coal available for marine and naval purposes. 



Turning now to the map of the world before you, you will see 

 how intimately Australia and New Zealand, in common with all parts 

 of the empire, are concerned in the defence of British naval stations 

 and in the efficiency of the squadrons which operate therefrom. You 

 will also understand that it is of paramount importance that these sta- 

 tions should be rendered thoroughly secure. They cannot fulfil the 

 conditions required of them if their anchorages, and the depots and 

 repairing establishments they contain, are not protected against hostile 

 occupation, capture, or destruction, during the absence of the squad- 

 rons they are intended to support. It is, I know, often said that the 

 defence of these stations should be dependent upon our fleet, but this 

 view will not bear examination. The depots are provided to enable 

 our vessels of war to command the sea, and those vessels cannot possess 

 the freedom of action which is necessary for the performance of their 

 duties if they are either tied down to particular places, or are obliged 

 to manoeuvre with a view to the protection of those places. The 

 Admiral on a station requires his ships for the defence of our com- 

 merce at sea, and he cannot detach them for the purpose of guarding 

 particular ports. If our naval squadrons be employed in defending 

 their depots, we should (as I have often pointed out) be using the 

 fleet to maintain the depots, instead of the depots to maintain the 

 fleet. Our naval depots, therefore, should be rendered secure in them- 

 selves and independent of the action of the fleet. They must be 

 fortified and garrisoned. If so defended, we are enabled to hold 

 them absolutely for the use of ourselves and our allies ; and our war 

 cruisers thus supported, and acting along the maritime routes of our 

 commerce, can afford effective protection to that commerce. If 

 unfortified, the depots would during the absence of our squad- 

 rons be as much the property of the enemy as of ourselves, 

 and would supply to hostile vessels the means of attacking our 

 commerce. 



Remember- the case of the "Alabama." You well know what 

 losses the mercantile marine of the Northern States suffered during 

 the civil war in America, from the "Alabama" and other ships of 

 that class cruising about on the tracks of commerce, and capturing 

 and burning merchant vessels carrying the United States flag. You 



