28 BULLETIN &79, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGEICL T LTUEE. 



B. at $25, the price paid for the other two. The hay he offers is a 

 part of the same lot, which was of uniform quality, as the first two 

 cars. Mr. B. also notes the weakened condition of the market and 

 wires an offer of $24 per ton for the two cars of No. 1 timothy for 

 immediate shipment, usual terms. Mr. A., having the hay already 

 loaded, accepts the offer and bills it out immediately. When the hay 

 reaches the market receipts are considerably in excess of the require- 

 ments of the trade, there is practically no demand, and the price of 

 No. 1 timothy has declined to $23 per ton. Buyers are more particu- 

 lar and will not pay full price for anything but strictly No. 1 tim- 

 othy. Mr- B. tries to sell the hay, but he can get no better offer than 

 $22. Several buyers tell him that his hay is only a good No. 2 tim- 

 othy. He knows that technically this is true, so rather than take a 

 loss he decides to have it officially inspected. 



Seeing the inspector in the yards, he calls him over to the cars 

 and states the case in words something like these : " Say, Brown. I 

 have two cars of hay here which I think grade about No. 2 timothy. 

 I bought them for No. 1, but I don't believe they will grade that. I 

 wish you would inspect them and give me a certificate of grade for 

 both cars. See the brown blades on all of the bales. There are too 

 many of them for No. 1 hay. It was cut a little too late, and three 

 bales up near the top are stained. Thej^ are really No. 3 hay. I have 

 an idea that the hay will run worse back from the doorway. How- 

 ever, you are the inspector. All I want is a fair deal." Since the 

 hay is really not No. 1 the inspector issues a certificate for grade 

 No. 2 timothy. 



No. 2 timothy is selling at a discount of $2 under No. 1, so Mr. B. 

 wires Mr. A. as follows : " Your two cars of hay in to-day. Grades 

 No. 2. Can accept on sale at $3 discount." Because Mr. A. has no 

 other orders at that time and also because of the expense of recon- 

 signment. he accepts the offer and obtains $21 per ton instead of 

 $24 for his hay. Besides losing the $3 per ton Mr. A. also loses faith 

 in the honesty of Mr. B. and decides not to ship to him again. He 

 can not understand why his hay is accepted as No. 1 when the mar- 

 ket is good, but graded No. 2 when the market is declining. On the 

 other hand, Mr. B. says that Mr. A. does not give him fair consid- 

 eration ; that he accepted the first two cars of Mr. A.'s hay which 

 were really not No. 1 and gave him a No. 1 price for them because he 

 himself had a profit: in that light Mr. A. should not object when 

 Mr. B. took only what, was really due him on the second lot. 



There is no way of knowing how many similar instances occur at 

 the various markets, but they are of a sufficient number to make it 

 desirable that organized markets take some notice of the matter of 

 acceptances and rejections and subject them to some uniform rule. 

 In many markets shippers can not demand the inspection of their 



