On Some Processes of Scientific Reasoning, 25 



at the table ? All that is proved directly is that certain 

 states of consciousness, those involved in directing my eyes 

 towards the table, are followed by certain other states of 

 consciousness, the sight of the table. J. S. Mill, G. Gro.te, 

 and others have very ably argued that all our know- 

 ledge is of states of consciousness and relations of co- 

 existence and sequence between them. Certainly, such 

 knowledge is the only sort of knowledge which admits of 

 verification by experience, which can prove nothing directly, 

 except relations between states of consciousness or pheno- 

 mena. It must, however, be admitted that all our beliefs 

 involve more than beliefs in such relations; that we have a 

 very strong belief in the existence of something underlying 

 phenomena, and which, in some sense, produces them. This 

 underlying something is what is denoted by Matter. Mr. 

 Mill himself admits that all our language involves the 

 belief in Matter as something different from phenomena ; 

 and, truly, he would have a difficult task to perform who 

 would endeavour to describe physical phenomena in intel- 

 ligible language, which involved no beliefs except beliefs in 

 relations between states of consciousness. So then, such a 

 statement as, "A table six feet long is in this room," im- 

 plies a large number of relations between states of con- 

 sciousness, and also the existence of something different 

 from those states, and which, partly, at all events, is the 

 cause of them. The former portion of the belief admits of 

 verification ; the latter does not. If " matter " were 

 suddenly annihilated, and some powerful spirit were to 

 cause states of consciousness to succeed each other in our 

 minds in the same order as they did before, we could not 

 detect the difference. In dreams and hallucinations states 

 of consciousness of a purely subjective origin excite the 

 belief in External Matter as vividly as those presented in 

 waking life. 



In the use of words which involve the belief in matter, 

 we have an example of the process which Mr. Lewes terms 

 the Introduction of Metempirical Elements into beliefs, 

 that is elements whose presence cannot be tested by 

 experience. 



Let us next consider the idea of Force. The origin of this 

 idea is to be sought in voluntary muscular motion. If I 

 move my arm, and introspectively observe the phenomenon, 

 I find it may be divided into three parts, 



1. The volition to move my arm. 



