On Some Processes of Scientific Reasoning. 31 



Now, the only phenomena exhibited by organic bodies which 

 our senses can perceive are mechanical, thermal, electric, and 

 chemical phenomena ; but the relations hetiveen organic 

 phenoTnena are different from the relations between physical 

 and chemical phenomena. Although physics and chemistry 

 may be competent to explain the actions which go on in a 

 dead animal, they are incapable of explaining those which 

 go on in a live one. If, then, we assume Vitality as an 

 "unknown something" which is the cause of those changes 

 which Mechanical Force, Heat, Electricity, and Chemical 

 Affinity cannot be the cause of, we are only adopting a 

 method which has been adopted and found useful in the 

 lower divisions of Science. But let us remember that what 

 Vitality is we know not, any more than we know what 

 Matter is, or, than three hundred years ago, we knew what 

 Light was. It is possible that as the metempirical concep- 

 tions of Heat and Light as abstract entities have been 

 replaced by the empirical conception of vibratory motion, 

 so Vitality may some day be replaced by an empirical 

 concept ; but, at all events, the day when this can be suc- 

 cessfully accomplished seems to be far distant. 



And as of Life, so of Mind. The relations between the 

 phenomena exhibited by what are called intelligent 

 beings are ultra-biological, as the relations between the 

 phenomena exhibited by all organic beings are ultra- 

 physical and ultra-chemical, and the introduction of a 

 metempirical conception Mind or Intelligence as the cause 

 of the ultra-biological relations is a Scientific process. But 

 although the objective study of intelligent beings has as 

 yet given us no certain information as to what Mind is, we 

 have a subjective knowledge of, at all events, one species of 

 Mind, as we have a subjective knowledge of one species of 

 Force. We must not, however, too rashly assume that all 

 Mind is the same as our Mind, as we must not assume that 

 all Force is the same as that species of Force which is 

 subjectively known as Effort. It is possible that some day 

 Mind, as considered objectively, may be replaced by some 

 empirical conception of vibration of nerve substance ; — Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer especially has made a very able attempt to 

 accomplish this ; * but that Mind as known subjectively is 

 nothing but such vibrations is, to me at all events, an 

 utterly inconceivable proposition. 



* Vide Herbert Spencer's " Principles of Psychology." 



