36 BULLETIN 1106, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGEICULTURE. 



he would not engage in the same business either at that place or 

 any other place or within a given area for a given period of time or 

 at any time. All such agreements appear to have been illegal in 

 the early days of the common law on the theory that they reduced 

 the opportunities of the seller to make a living and tended to 

 monopoly.-^ Later such agreements were upheld if deemed rea- 

 sonable. At this time they are generally upheld if the restrictions 

 on the right of the seller to engage in business are no greater than 

 those reasonably necessary for the protection of the buyer.^^ 



Gradually the terms " monopoly " and " restraint of trade " took 

 on a broader meaning. The term " monopoly " has come to mean the 

 concentration of business in the hands of a few ^^ or a combination 

 of persons or corporations for the purpose of raising or controlling 

 the prices of merchandise or any of the necessaries of life.^^ The 

 expression " restraint of trade " is now used as the equivalent of re- 

 straint of competition and both terms are employed to describe a 

 situation where illegal means are used to eliminate or restrict com- 

 petition, or to control prices, or to form a monopoly. 



This proposition is illustrated by a Kentucky case ^^ in which the 

 plaintiffs were the principal buyers of bluegrass seed in that State. 

 They entered into a secret partnership under which each of the 

 buyers was to continue to operate apparently independently. How- 

 ever, the scheme contemplated that they would secure control of the 

 market for bluegrass seed and suppress competition. The scheme 

 involved the fixing of the price to be paid for seed, the distribution 

 among themselves of seed offered for sale, the price at which seed 

 should be sold, and the sharing of profits and losses. The defendant 

 entered into a contract with a secret agent of plaintiff under which 

 he agreed to sell a quantity of bluegrass seed. He refused to carry 

 out his contract, and suit was brought against him. The Supreme 

 Court of Kentucky, in holding the contract invalid as part of an un- 

 lawful scheme, said * * * 



Taking for a fonndatiou the principle that illegal and unreasonable restraint 

 of trade is obnoxious to the spirit of the law * * * this principle will be 

 extended * * * to embrace every condition in which an unlawful attempt 

 is made to restrain trade and control the market and suppress competition by- 

 whatever means these ends are sought to be accomplished. 



This case illustrates another well-settled principle, namely, that 

 where a contract is held to be in restraint of trade and has not been 

 performed the court will refuse to enforce it or allow damages for 



^Anson on Contracts, see. 255. 



2a Lumbermen's Trust Co. v. Title Insurance & Inv. Co.. 248 Fed. 212. 



23 National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Ass'n., 169 Fed. 259, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 



148. 



»* Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 114 111. App. 75. 



25 Brent v. Gay, 149 Ky. 615, 149 S. W. 915, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034. 



