40 BULLETIN 1106, U. S. DEPAETMENT OF AGEICULTUEE. 



is therein made the duty of the commission, in case it believes 

 that any such association "Restrains trade or, lessens competition 

 to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is 

 enhanced beyond the cost of production plus a reasonable profit," to 

 proceed against such an association for the purpose of causing it to 

 " Cease and desist from so restraining trade and lessening com- 

 petition in such article." The Ohio statute in many particulars in 

 similar to the Capper-Volstead Act, which will be discussed later. 



SECTION 6 OF THE CLAYTON ACT. 



This section reads as follows : 



That the labor of a human behig is not a commodity or article of commerce- 

 Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exist- 

 ence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted 

 for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for 

 profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from 

 lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organiza- 

 tions, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations 

 or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 



It seems to be generally agreed that this section would appear to 

 prevent the dissolution of an organization of farmers which meets 

 the conditions it prescribes, namely, that it is a " labor, agricultural, 

 or horticultural organization;" that it is " instituted for the purposes 

 of mutual help," and doesnot have "capital stock;" and last, is not 

 " conducted for profit." However, the few decisions of the courts 

 relative to this section indicate that it does not enable them, if desired, 

 to adopt methods of conducting their operations denied to other law- 

 ful business organizations. In a case ^^ decided by the Supreme Court 

 involving the legality of a secondary boycott by a labor organization 

 it was said : 



As to section 6, it seems to us its principal importance in this discussion 

 is for what it does not authorize and for the limit it sets to the immunity 

 conferred. The section assumes the normal objects of a labor organization to 

 be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the antitrust laws shall be con- 

 strued to forbid the existence and operation of such organizations or to forbid 

 their members from laivfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that 

 such an organization shall not be held in itself — merely because of its exist- 

 ence and operation — to be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of 

 trade. But there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or 

 its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and 

 legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in 

 restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken 

 as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful 

 organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in re- 

 straint of trade as defined by the antitrust laws. 



»« Duplex Co. V. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 ; see also Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65. 



