Art. VI. — Proportional Representation. 

 By Professor E. J. Nanson. 



[Read July 8th, 1880.] 



Various plans have been proposed for obtaining a nearer 

 approach to proportional representation than is afforded by 

 the majority system in common use. These plans have 

 been classed by M. Ernest Naville under two heads, 

 " Empirical Systems/' and " Scientific Systems." Under 

 the first head are included the single vote, the cumulative 

 vote, and the restricted vote. These systems are in many 

 respects superior to the majority system, but they are 

 one and all open to a very serious objection. It is that the 

 electors are compelled to submit to the dictation of party 

 leaders, and adopt some process of organisation under pain 

 of compromising their party, and depriving it of its fair 

 share of representation. Besides this, if it should happen 

 that the calculations of the leaders are wrong, the party 

 does not obtain its fair share of the representation. Thus, 

 in a three-cornered constituency, two-fifths of the electors 

 may easily return two of the representatives, leaving the 

 majority of three-fifths with one representative only. 



Again, the single vote and the cumulative vote are liable 

 to an enormous waste of voting power. Thus, for instance, 

 at the School Board elections in 1870, for Marvlebone, 

 Lambeth, Sheffield, and Birmingham, the percentages of 

 wasted votes were 66 } 57, 54, and 48 respectively. 



Under the head of " Scientific Systems," M. Naville 

 includes the preferential vote, the independent ticket vote, 

 and the uninominal vote. 



The first of these, due to M. Andrae and Mr. Hare, is 

 fully explained in the subsequent part of this paper. The 

 second and third are modifications of the preferential vote. 

 In the second, any body of electors exceeding a given 

 number (say SO) can put forward a " ticket." The electors 

 are then permitted to vote for any of these tickets. In the 

 third, instead of each elector making a list of candidates to 

 whom his vote may be successively transferred, each 

 candidate makes a list of the other candidates to whom the 



