Proportional Representation. 35 



superfluous or useless votes given to him are to be 

 transferred. These lists are published before the election, 

 and each elector votes for one candidate. 



The preferential vote is the only plan which will make the 

 electors entirely independent of party leaders and party 

 organisation, and it appears to be the most perfect system 

 which can be devised for approximating to proportional 

 representation. It is to be particularly noticed that the 

 preferential vote applies to all cases alike, whether there be 

 one, two, three, or a hundred vacancies to be filled. Hence it 

 might be applied to the present electorates of this colony. 

 But a great advantage would be gained by doing away with 

 electorates returning one member. For with equal electorates 

 returning one member apiece, it is possible under any system 

 of voting for a trifle over 25 per cent, of the electors who 

 vote to return a majority of the representatives; and if the 

 electorates be not equal, a still smaller percentage might 

 return the majority. Now, although exactly the same result 

 could happen under the majority system if the electorates 

 have more than one member apiece, the case is very different 

 with the preferential vote. Under that system, with equal 

 electorates returning each n members, it would not be 

 possible for less than J ~rri of the whole number of voters to 

 return half of the representatives. Thus, if each electorate 

 had five representatives, it would require at least 42 per 

 cent, of the voters to return half the representatives; whereas, 

 under the majority system, 25 per cent, could return half 

 the representatives. 



With single electorates we see, then, that the majority 

 system and the preferential system are alike subject to the 

 anomaly just pointed out. But the preferential vote would 

 be superior in two respects. First, we should be sure that 

 the majority would rule in each electorate, whereas, under 

 the so-called majority system, we have no such certainty; 

 and, secondly, the electors themselves would be able to 

 decide who was the best candidate on their own side, 

 whereas at present the candidates have to be chosen and 

 nominated by party leaders. If, however, the preferential 

 vote be applied to electorates returning two or more repre- 

 sentatives, the anomaly just described is got rid of to a very 

 great extent, and if the number of representatives be made 

 sufficiently great, it disappears completely. 



In illustration of the preceding remarks on the majority 

 system, it may be mentioned that, at the last general election 



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