40 Proportional Representation. 



exceeds the quota is called the surplus of that candidate. 

 Thus, the candidates A, B, &c, having a surplus, we see that, 

 (1) that surplus can be transferred to the unelected candi- 

 dates, P, Q, R, &c; (2) there are many ways in which this 

 can be done ; (3) the result of the election may depend very 

 materially upon the way in which it is done. 



M. Andrae proposed to 'make this distribution by lot. 

 Mr. Hare proposes to make it by a series of rules, depending 

 on, (1) the different electoral divisions, &c, in which the 

 votes were polled ; (2) the number of names indicated on 

 the voting-papers ; (3) a prescribed order among the different 

 polling-booths at which the votes were polled; (4) the 

 order in which the papers were polled. The first of these 

 principles was adopted in order to preserve local represen- 

 tation as much as possible. The second principle seems to be 

 very objectionable, on the ground that it makes it necessary 

 for a voter to mark a large number of names on his voting- 

 paper in order to give the paper a reasonable chance of 

 being transferred, and hence a great inducement is held out 

 to voters to mark a large number of names indiscriminately. 

 The third and fourth principles introduce the element of 

 chance, so that, in fact, the result of an election may depend 

 upon the order in which the voters go to the poll, or upon 

 the arbitrary decision of the authority that prescribes the 

 order of the polling-booths. It can scarcely be doubted 

 that a method of distribution which depends only upon the 

 voting papers themselves, and not upon any external circum- 

 stances, such as the order of polling, place of polling, &c, 

 would be more satisfactory. Several such methods might 

 be suggested ; but any method to be satisfactory must 

 satisfy the following conditions : 



I. It must be reasonably simple. 



II. It must not put a premium upon organisation, such as 

 voting on a uniform ticket. 



III. It must be as equitable as the circumstances of the 

 case admit. 



So far as I know no such method has been published ; 

 and it is one of the principal objects of this paper to describe 

 a method which, I hope, will be found satisfactory. 



In the method proposed the first principle is to divide 

 the surplus of an elected candidate as equally as possible 

 amongst the unelected candidates, who are indicated as the 

 next choice of the electors on the papers of the elected 

 candidate. An immediate consequence of this principle is 



