204 Methods of Election. 



must be used for the second election, and that this second 

 election cannot be held till the result of the first is known, 

 so that the electors have the expense and trouble of going 

 to the poll a second time. This, at all events, appears to be 

 the practice in France, Germany, and Italy. This, however, 

 is not necessary; for, by a very simple expedient, any 

 number of preliminary elections, on any plan whatever, may 

 be held by means of a single set of voting papers, and with- 

 out troubling the electors to vote more than once. The 

 expedient is to require each elector to indicate his order of 

 preference amongst all the candidates. Once get this infor- 

 mation from the electors, and we can tell how any elector 

 will vote on any question that may be put as to the merits 

 of the candidates. It is here assumed that an elector will 

 not change his opinion during the course of the election. 

 This expedient of making each elector indicate his order of 

 preference amongst all the candidates is necessary in order 

 to carry out Borda's method, which has been described 

 above; indeed, it was suggested by Borda himself. But Borda 

 does not appear to have noticed that it might be made use 

 of for a series of elections without requiring the electors to 

 vote again ; this appears to have been first pointed out by 

 Condorcet. The idea of a preferential or comparative voting 

 paper is one of the fundamental ones in Hare's system of 

 proportional representation. We are not concerned with 

 this subject here, as the only question under consideration is 

 that of filling a single vacancy. It is, however, worthy of 

 notice that the preferential voting paper which is such an 

 important feature in Hare's system, is of such old origin, 

 and that it was suggested by Condorcet as a means of filling 

 several vacancies, which is the very question considered by 

 Hare. The method of Condorcet, however, is quite different 

 to that of Hare. 



If the expedient here described were adopted, the French 

 system would be free from the practical objection which 

 has been indicated. It would still, however, be open to the 

 objection that the result of the election might be contrary 

 to the views of the electors. Notwithstanding this, the 

 method would be a good practical one for elections on a 

 large scale; it would be very suitable for party contests, and 

 if neither, side ran. too many candidates, the result could not 

 be wrong. The method, however, would be altogether un- 

 suitable if there were three distinct parties to the contest. 

 Under any circumstances, however, the method would be 



