Methods of Election. 205 



very little more complicated than the present system of 

 single voting, and it would give much better results. If, 

 however, it be considered desirable to reform the present 

 electoral system so far as to introduce this French system of 

 double elections, it would be as well to at once adopt the 

 method of Ware, described below. This is the same, in the 

 case of three candidates, as the French method, but in other 

 cases it is a trifle longer. No difference whatever would 

 be required in the method of voting, but only a little more 

 labour on the part of the returning officer. The results of 

 this method would be much more trustworthy than those 

 of the French method. 



Other Methods of the Second Class. 



Before passing on tothe methods of the third class, it may 

 be stated that each of the methods described under that 

 heading may be conducted on the system of the second 

 class. In order to do so, instead of using a preferential 

 voting paper, as in the methods of the third class, we must 

 suppose a fresh appeal made to the electors after each 

 scrutiny. This, of course, would make the methods need- 

 lessly complex, and, in the case of a large number of 

 electors, totally impracticable. This, however, is not the 

 only objection to the methods of the second class. For if 

 the electors be allowed to vote again after the result of one 

 of the preliminary elections is known, information is given 

 which may induce an elector to transfer his allegiance from 

 a candidate he has been supporting to another candidate 

 whom he finds has more chance of success. A method 

 which permits, and which even encourages, electors to 

 change their views in the middle of the contest cannot be 

 considered perfect. This objection does not apply to those 

 cases in which there are only three candidates, or to any 

 case in which all but two candidates are rejected at the 

 first preliminary election, as in the French system. 



There is another objection, however, which applies to all 

 cases alike ; it is that, at the first preliminary election, an 

 astute elector may vote, not according to his real views, 

 but may, taking advantage of the fact that there is to be a 

 second election, vote for some inferior candidate in order to 

 get rid, at the first election, of a formidable competitor of 

 the candidate he wishes to win. If this practice be adopted 

 by a few of the supporters of each of the more formidable 



